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The purpose of this thesis is to identify and discuss
the components of large purchase Procurement Administrative
Lead Time (PALT) at the Naval Regional Contracting Center
(NRCC) Philadelphia and techniques which may be employed by
NRCC personnel to reduce PALT given the current acquisition
environment at the NRCC. Findings were that implementation
of the initiatives in the Competition in Contracting Act
(CICA) of 1984 and the Productive Unit Resourcing System
(PURS) have resulted in increased PALT. The major
conclusion is that NRCC Philadelphia is employing the
correct techniques for control and management of PALT.
Recommendations include initiation of a customer education
and training program, early synopsis of appropriate
requirements, revising the PURS unit weighting system, and
development of a MIS to reduce PALT.
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. INTRODUCTION
A. PROCUREMENT ADMINISTRATIVE LEAD TIME (PALT)
Procurement Administrative Lead Time (PALT) at the Naval
Regional Contracting Center (NRCC) , Philadelphia, is defined
as that time period commencing when a procurement request
(PR) is received at the Center through to the actual signing
of an award document by the appropriate contracting officer.
PALT is one of the two main components of procurement lead
time (PCLT) ; the other component is production lead time
(PLT) , which is the time from the date of the contract to
the date of receipt of the first significant delivery under
the contract. [Ref . l:p.l]
There are two distinct types of PALT: gross PALT and
net PALT. Gross PALT is the total cumulative number of days
from receipt of the PR through contract award. Net PALT is
gross PALT adjusted for any of the following three
situat ions
:
1. If, after receipt of the PR, it is determined that the
Statement of Work (SOW) or specifications are
technically deficient and must be revised by returning
the PR to the requiring activity.
2. If a protest occurs prior to award of a contract,
including those protests made to the General
Accounting Office (GAO) , the General Services Board of
Contract Appeals (GSBCA) , or the contracting officer.
3. If, prior to award, a delay is caused due to lack of
funding or funding constraint. [Ref
. 2:p.4.6-29]
Over the years, the Naval Supply Systems Command
(NAVSUP) has managed PALT at its field contracting
activities by issuing standards, goals, and most recently by
negotiating PALT goals in business plans with the activity
Commanding Officers, In a 1977 instruction, for example,
NAVSUP promulgated a Large Purchase PALT Matrix which
defined PALT goals for various contract types and dollar
values [Ref 3] . Figure 1 depicts the PALT matrix goals in
numbers of days from receipt of PR to award of contract.
This system proved to be less than optimal due to the great
variability between contracting activities in customer base
and types of requirements. As no two contracting activities
are alike, the system was inefficient and unrealistic for
each activity to have the same PALT goals.
Beginning in 1986, NAVSUP implemented a business plan
system in which each activity negotiated with NAVSUP its
productivity and funding goals for the next fiscal year.
One element of the negotiation is the large and small
purchase PALT goal averages which the activities agree to
work within during the upcoming fiscal year. This system
allows the activities some latitude in defining business
goals. It is a more effective system as it is the activity
that best understands its respective business base and the
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business plan, NRCC Philadelphia negotiated a large purchase
goal of 83 days gross average PALT
.
PALT is an important factor in the acquisition process
as any delays in the administrative process inhibit the
contracting officer's ability to award a contract and ensure
timely delivery of goods and services to the end-user.
While recent legislation, such as the Competition in
Contracting Act (CICA) and others has been aimed at reducing
prices paid for goods and services, these initiatives have
fostered increased PALT. A more detailed review of CICA and
other initiatives and programs will be presented in Chapter
IV of this st udy
.
B. FOCUS OF RESEARCH
The main thrust of this study will be to identify and
discuss the components of PALT specifically for NRCC
Philadelphia but generically for the overall Navy Field
Contracting System (NFCS) . Factors both internal and
external to the acquisition process will be discussed and
analyzed with a view towards providing recommendations that
will assist in the reduction of PALT for NRCC Philadelphia
and the NFCS.
The goal of this thesis is to provide NRCC Philadelphia
and other NFCS contracting personnel with information
necessary for management control and reduction of PALT,
while maintaining the benefits of CICA and other procurement
legislation and programs. NRCC Philadelphia will benefit
from the information presented because of the resultant
reduction in PALT and the improvement in NRCC's ability to
procure end-user goods and services for its fleet and shore
based customer activities.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Based on the objectives cited above, the following
primary research question is addressed in this study:
What are the principal factors which
comprise PALT and how have these factors been
affected by the changing acquisition environment,
leading to increased PALT?
In support of the primary research question, the
following subsidiary questions are addressed:
1. Are the methods currently utilized by NFCS procurement
managers to control PALT effective?
2. What affect has the increased emphasis on competition
fostered by CICA implementation had on PALT?
3. Is the relationship between PALT, productivity, and
output of a quality contractual product a workable
relationship?




Should current PALT standards be revised?
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The information presented in this study was obtained
through primary and secondary research. Primary research
consisted of personal and telephone interviews of key
personnel within the contracting directorate of NAVSUP and
10
contracts division of NRCC Philadelphia. Additional
interviews of contracts/purchasing managers at the Defense
Industrial Supply Center (DISC) and private industry were
conducted to obtain non-Navy viewpoints on the management
and control of PALT . Other types of data utilized in this
study were local documents, statistical data, and records
provided by NRCC Philadelphia.
The secondary research methodology employed was a review
of relevant literature. The review was conducted to acquire
a historical perspective of PALT issues. Literature was
obtained from various sources, including NAVSUP, the Naval
Postgraduate School library, and the Defense Logistics
Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE) . Additionally, current
and past DOD and Federal instructions, directives and
regulations, previous theses and current publications
relevant to the Federal procurement industry were reviewed.
E. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
This thesis is limited to studying the procurement
process at NRCC Philadelphia for end-user goods and services
valued in excess of $25,000. The small purchase process at
NRCC Philadelphia was not included in the research for this
study
.
The study focuses on the procurement process from the
point when a PR is received by the Center until an award
document is signed by the contracting officer. This study
11
also discusses the impact of recent procurement legislation
and productivity enhancement programs implemented by NAVSUP
that affect PALT at all NFCS activities. In addition,
research was also conducted at the Defense Industrial Supply
Center (DISC) large purchase organization and commercial
purchasing activities as a means of comparison of management
controls and PALT management techniques.
F. ASSUMPTIONS
Throughout this study it is assumed that the reader is
familiar with the Federal Acquisition process and the
limitations and idiosyncrasies associated with it. It is
further assumed that the reader is familiar with basic Naval
terminology and with basic contracting and acquisition
terminology. If the reader desires, additional detailed
information of the DOD Acquisition process may be obtained
from the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the Defense
Supplement to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (DFAR) , and
the Navy Acquisition Regulation Supplement (NARSUP)
.
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This thesis is organized to give the reader a
comprehensive overview of the acquisition process at NRCC
Philadelphia and the legislative and programmatic
environment which inhibits the process. Chapter II presents
a discussion of the acquisition process as it pertains to
12
NRCC Philadelphia. The discussion includes a review of the
basic components of PALT
.
Chapter III provides a review of the changing
acquisition environment and focuses on two major
initiatives, CICA and PURS, which have had the most
significant affect on the acquisition process at NRCC
Philadelphia. Chapter IV presents an Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) of PALT statistics at NRCC Philadelphia during the
period October 1984 through September 1987.
Chapter V provides conclusions of the research effort
and offers recommendations for ways to reduce PALT and







This chapter focuses on the phases of the acquisition
process as it is followed at NRCC Philadelphia. It is
presumed that although the process described pertains
specifically to the NRCC, the process is generically the
same for all activities of the Navy Field Contracting
System
.
B. THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
1 . The Pre-solicitat ion Phase
The acquisition process begins at NRCC Philadelphia
when a purchase request (PR) is received in Contracts
Division. At this point, the PALT clock, begins ticking.
The PR may be hand carried to the NRCC by a representative
of the customer activity, or it may be received in the mail
or via telecopier from customers in outlying areas. An
internal control number is assigned to the PR and it is
forwarded in a folder to the appropriate branch in the
Contracts Division. The Contracts Division at NRCC
Philadelphia, depicted in Figure 2, is organized by customer
(requiring activity) . Each branch is assigned a number of











































Figure 2. NRCC Philadelphia Contracts Division
Source: Developed by Researcher
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support and services . The Branch Head assigns the PR to one
of several GS-1102 Contracts Specialists within his branch.
At this point, the Contracts Specialist reviews the




Is the Statement of Work (SOW) complete and accurate
and does it present a requirement that is con-
tractable?
2. Are all the necessary approvals attached, e.g.:
approval by the General Services Administration
(GSA) to procure Automatic Data Processing
Equipment (ADPE)
?
3. Is the requirement competitive or does the requiring
activity specify sole source? If sole source, is
the proper Justification and Approval (J&A) for
other than full and open competition enclosed?
4. Is technical data required? Is a properly completed
DD Form 1423, Contract Data Requirements List,
enclosed?
5 Is proper and sufficient funding provided?
After review of the PR package, the Contracts
Specialist checks for previous buys of the same or similar
goods or services for historical evidence of adequate price
competition, sources, past protests, or other problems in
previous procurements
.
If the PR is complete and does not require return to
the requiring activity for any reason, the Contracts
Specialist completes a Small Business Review Form and
submits it to the Small and Disadvantaged Business
Utilization Specialist (SADBUS) for review for possible full
or partial set-aside for small business. After review by
16
the SADBUS , the resident Small Business Administration
representative signs off on the Small Business Review Form
and returns it to the Contracts Specialist.
If the small business set-aside decision is not a
matter for contention or further review, the Contracts
Specialist composes and submits a synopsis of the
requirement to the Commerce Business Daily (CBD) . The
synopsis must be published in the CBD for a minimum of 15
days prior to the issuance of a solicitation [Ref . 4:Pt.5]
,
There is usually an additional six-day period from
transmittal of the synopsis to the CBD and first
publication. During the mandatory waiting period, the
Contracts Specialist assembles the solicitation package. In
addition, if the requirement is valued greater than
$1,000,000 (if a firm fixed price contract is anticipated)
or over $500,000 (if other than firm fixed price), the
Contracts Specialist prepares the required package for
review by a formal Contracts Review Board (CRB) . For
requirements below the thresholds, the same documentation is
prepared; however, it is signed and approved at the
contracting officer level
.
The CRB, consisting of the Commanding Officer,
Executive Officer, Counsel, Contracts Division Director and
one or more Branch Heads reviews the requirement and the
Contracts Specialist's rationale and strategy for proceeding
through to the negotiation phase of the acquisition. If
17
the CRB approves the plan and the requirement is not sole
source or limited competition, the solicitation is issued at
the end of the 15 day synopsis waiting period.
If the planned procurement is valued in excess of
$50,000 and other than full and open competition is
contemplated, the requirement package goes before a second
review board. This board, called the Justification and
Approval Board, consists of the same membership as the CRB
with the addition of the Competition Program Manager. If
the J&A is approved, the Request for Proposal (RFP) is
issued, and the solicitation phase begins. If the
requirement is valued at $1,000,000 or above, the J&A must
be submitted to NAVSUP for approval. Above $10,000,000 the
approval of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (S&L) is
required
.
2 . The Solicitation Phase
In accordance with the FAR, solicitations
(Invitations for Bid (IFB) and Requests for Proposal (RFP))
must remain open for a minimum of 30 days from the date of
issuance of the solicitation [Ref . 4:Pt.5] . The
solicitation phase may prove to be considerably longer than
the 30 days, as solicitations are often amended to make
changes in quantities, specifications, and delivery
schedules or to correct defects or ambiguities in the
contract terms and conditions. In many instances, the
Contracts Specialist will change the closing date for
18
receipt of proposals to allow potential offerors extra time
to assimilate the changed terms or conditions.
Additionally, the Contracts Specialist may change the
closing date in response to a request from an offeror, if he
considers the request to be reasonable and in the best
interest of the Government
.
Another factor which may lengthen solicitation
periods is the pre-proposal conference. The pre-proposal
conference is usually conducted by the Contracts Specialist
in conjunction with technical representatives from the
requiring activity and legal counsel if considered to be
appropriate. The conference is held to "brief prospective
offerors after a solicitation has been issued but before
offers are submitted. Generally, the Government uses these
conferences in complex negotiated acquisitions to explain or
clarify complicated specifications and requirements."
[Ref. 4:Pt.l5]
As bids and proposals are received at the NRCC , they
are marked with the time and date of receipt and safeguarded
until the closing date. In the case of IFBs , the bid
officer abstracts the bids at the bid opening and gives the
abstract and the bid packages to the Contracts Specialist,
In negotiated procurements, the proposals are given intact






The Evaluation. Negotiation and Award Phase
The steps in the evaluation, negotiation and award
phase differ depending upon several factors including:
1. Whether the procurement is sealed bid or negotiated;
2. If negotiated, the extent of competition received;
3. The presence of technical and cost proposals;
4. The type of contract anticipated.
If the procurement is following sealed bid
procedures, the Contracts Specialist determines the
responsiveness of the apparent low bidder to the
Government's requirement. To be responsive, the bidder must
"accept all the terms and conditions of the invitation"
[Ref. 4:Pt.l4]. Next, the Contracts Specialist must
determine if the bidder is responsible. To be responsible,
the bidder must meet the following criteria:
1
.
Have adequate financial resources to perform the
contract, or the ability to obtain them;
2. Be able to comply with the required or proposed
delivery or performance schedule, taking into
consideration all existing commercial and
governmental business commitments;
3. Have a satisfactory performance record;
4 Have a satisfactory record of integrity and
business ethics;
5. Have the necessary organization, experience,
accounting and operational controls, and
technical skills, or the ability to obtain
them;
6. Have the necessary production, construction,
and technical equipment and facilities, or
the ability to obtain them;
20
7. Be otherwise qualified and eligible to receive





To make the determination of responsibility, the
Contracts Specialist must possess or obtain the requisite
information. Historical files may be consulted as well as
other contracts specialists and supervisors. If the
information is not available in-house, the Contracts
Specialist may request a pre-award survey by the cognizant
Defense Contract Administration Service (DCAS) activity.
Usually, the pre-award survey requests information about the
low bidder and those other offerors in possible contention
for an award.
Additionally, the Contract Specialist must satisfy
himself that the low bidder's price is reasonable by using
one or more of the following techniques:
1
.
Comparison of proposed prices received in response to
the solicitation;
2. Comparison of prior proposed prices and contract
prices with current proposed prices for the
same or similar items;
3. Application of rough yardsticks to highlight sig-
nificant inconsistencies;
4. Comparison with competitive published price lists,
published market prices of commodities, similar
indexes, and discount or rebate arrangements;
5 Comparison of proposed prices with independent
Government cost estimates. [Ref. 4:Pt.l5]
Finally, the Contracts Specialist may award a Firm
Fixed Price or Fixed Price with Economic Price Adjustment
21
type contract to the "responsible bidder whose bid is
responsive to the terms of the invitation for bids and is
most advantageous to the government..." [Ref. 4:Pt.l4].
Procurement clerical personnel within the branch generate
the appropriate award documents and submit them to the
Contracts Specialist for proofreading and review. After
review, the Contracts Specialist gives the award document to
the Contracting Officer for signature. It is at this point
that the PALT clock stops. Some PALT may be saved by the
issuance of a Notice of Award, signed by the Contracting
Officer, prior to the actual forwarding of the award
document. A letter Notice of Award may be used at any time,
but is most appropriate when the award document will be
delayed for some reason.
For competitive negotiated and negotiated sole-
source requirements, PALT may be significantly longer
because of the additional steps the Contracts Specialist
must follow. After abstracting the proposals received, the
Contracts Specialist develops his evaluation strategy based
upon the type of requirement, the extent of competition, and
the contract type anticipated. If technical proposals are
included, they are forwarded to the requiring activity for
evaluation by technical personnel. Discussions may be
conducted with offerors to clarify ambiguities or unclear
information; however, offerors are not advised of
deficiencies in their technical proposals. Offerors with
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unacceptable technical proposals who have little chance for
award are removed from the competition.
The next step in the evaluation, negotiation, and
award phase is the evaluation of cost/price proposals. If
adequate price competition exists, or the proposed prices
are based on established catalog or market prices or set by
law or regulation, the Contracts Specialist need not require
cost or pricing data from offerors in the competitive range.
Where adequate price competition does not exist, such as in
the case of a sole-source procurement, cost or pricing data
is required from offerors when the value of the proposed
award exceeds $100,000. (Cost or pricing data may also be
required from prospective contractors when the proposed
procurement is valued between $25,000 - $100,000 and the
contracting officer believes requesting cost or pricing data
is in the best interests of the government.) Further, in
sole source procurements and in competitive procurements
when only one proposal is received and the Contracts
Specialist cannot justify the price, the Defense Contract
Audit Agency (DCAA) is requested to review both the cost or
pricing data and the contractor's proposals and to provide
audit reports
.
After the technical and cost/price proposals have
been evaluated, the Contract Specialist develops a pre-
negotiation clearance which outlines in detail the results
of the evaluations, the establishment of the competitive
23
range, the method in which negotiations are to be conducted,
and if Best and Final Offers (BAFOs) are to be requested.
After the pre-negot iat ion clearance is presented to
the CRB and approved, the Contracts Specialist enters into
negotiations with all offerors in the competitive range.
The negotiations lead ultimately to submission of BAFOs.
Prior to reaching agreement with the apparent winner, the
Contracts Specialist may request that DCAS perform a pre-
award survey to determine responsibility. At the conclusion
of negotiations, a post-negotiation clearance is prepared
which outlines the results of the negotiations. The post-
negotiation clearance is presented to the CRB and, if the
agreement is deemed to be reasonable and in the best
interests of the government, the clearance is approved and
award is made. As with sealed bid procedures, PALT stops
when the award document is signed or when a Notice of Award
is signed and issued by the contracting officer.
C . SUMMARY
This chapter presented a detailed discussion of the
acquisition process at NRCC Philadelphia and the basic
components of PALT. Hopefully the reader has gained an
appreciation for the complex and time-consuming nature of
the acquisition process at the NRCC and generically for the
overall NFCS . The following chapter presents a review of
the acquisition environment in which the process must work.
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III. THE CHANGING ACQUISITION ENVIRONMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter focuses on the changing acquisition
environment at NRCC Philadelphia within which the
acquisition process described in Chapter II must function.
It discusses two recent initiatives that have had broad
affect on the overall process and specifically on PALT
.
Following the discussions, an evaluation of the impact of
the initiatives on PALT is presented.
Recent Media "horror stories" did much to foster a
negative opinion of the DOD acquisition system;
consequently, for the past four or five years the system has
been under almost constant attack. Allegations of fraud,
waste, and abuse have been made throughout DOD. Agencies,
both internal and external to the process, have reacted
swiftly to the allegations by increasingly regulating the
process
.
Another aspect of the problem is the sheer size of the
procurement system. DOD acquisition is big business. Over
15 million contracts valued in excess of $150 billion are
awarded annually. Congress, as the "keeper of the purse",
has the responsibility to ensure that public funds are
efficiently and effectively allocated and obligated.
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To maintain its "finger on the pulse" of DOD
acquisition. Congress has enacted broad-scoped legislation,
making the 1980s the decade of procurement reform.
Legislation such as the Defense Procurement Reform Act of
1984, the Small Business and Federal Procurement Competition
Enhancement Act of 1984, and the annual National Defense
Authorization and Appropriation Acts have all impacted the
process by which DOD acquires its necessary goods and
services
.
One Act alone, (the Competition in Contracting Act
(CICA) of 1984) has had the moat widespread affect on the
acquisition process since the Armed Services Procurement
Reform Act of 1947. CICA has changed the process, the
methodology and the very nature of the Federal procurement
business. As a part of this change, CICA led to an increase
in the amount of time required to contract.
Influenced perhaps by the notoriety received by DOD over
alleged inefficiencies pervasive throughout all levels and
activities of the Department, the Naval Supply Systems
Command (NAVSUP) implemented in FY 86 a system to enhance
productivity and economy of operations . This system, known
as Productive Unit Resourcing (PURS) , has also had an impact
on the acquisition process. While not having as direct and
tangible an affect as has CICA, PURS has led to change in
the management of the process and the worforce's approach to
satisfying the many and varied requirements placed on them.
26
B. THE COMPETITION IN CONTRACTING ACT OF 1984
CICA was implemented in the midst of, and most certainly
as a direct result of, great public concern over the Federal
Government's ability to economically and efficiently procure
goods and services. Signed by the President into law on 18
July 1984 as Title VII of the Spending Reduction Act and
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, it represented "an
amalgamation of bills .. .considered in the 98th Congress
bringing together parts of several Senate and House
resolutions." [Ref . 5:p. 119] CICA was a clear indication
of Congress' firm belief that increased competition was the
key to success in Federal procurement. The thrust for
increased competition, though, was not just restricted to
Congress. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman in August 1984
pronounced "increased competition in procurement of products
and services is a major Navy objective for 1984."
[Ref. 5] The Navy, it appeared, had jumped on the
competition bandwagon prior to CICA' s implementation.
The changes to the acquisition process wrought by CICA
are many, but none have been more significant than the
abandonment of the historical preference for formal
advertising which had been in effect since 1809 [Ref. 7:pp.
8,22] . Under the rules established by the Armed Services
Procurement Act of 1947, all procurements were to be awarded
27
using formal advertising unless the proposed procurement met
one of 17 exceptions. Under CICA "sealed bidding" (the new
name for formal advertising) was required when four
conditions were met:
1. Time permits the solicitation, submission and
evaluation of sealed bids;
2. The award will be made on the basis of price and other
price related factors;
3. It is not necessary to conduct discussions with the
responding sources about their bids;
4 . There is a reasonable expectation of receiving more
than one sealed bid. [Ref . 8]
If a procurement does not meet any of the above
conditions, it may be awarded using competitive proposal
procedures. The competitive proposal procedures, replacing
the term "negotiation", are used when any of the above
conditions 1-3 cannot be met. Primarily, however,
competitive proposal procedures are used when discussions
are required with prospective contractors to reach a
contractual agreement. It is permitted, under the
competitive proposal procedures, to make an award without
discussions. A determination must be made that, by
accepting the initial proposals, an award would result in
the lowest cost to the government. [Ref. 5:p. 127]
Thus, with CICA, Congress' primary concern is no longer
what procedures were used to make an award, but to whom the
award is made and how many other sources were considered
along the way. [Ref. 7:p. 8]
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While the pervasive impetus of CICA is competition,
there remain certain situations in which the government is
permitted to award a contract using non-competitive
procedures. The seven exceptions to "full and open
competition" are:
1. When only one responsible source is available and no
alternate type of service will satisfy its needs.
2. Under unusual or compelling urgency, when the
government would be seriously injured unless the
agency limited the number of solicited sources.
3. When restriction of an award to a particular source is
required because of:
a. the necessity to maintain a particular source to
ensure its continued availability in the event of
national emergency or to achieve industrial
mobilization or
b. the award is required in order to establish or
maintain an essential engineering research or
development capability provided by an educational
or other non-profit institution or a federally
funded research and development center.
4
.
When the source is restricted under the terms of an
international agreement or treaty or by direction of a
foreign government that is reimbursing the executive
agency for the cost of the procurement.
5 When the item is a brand name commercial item for
authorized resale, or a statute expressly authorizes
or requires that the source be restricted.
6. When national security requires that the disclosure of
the executive agency's requirement be limited to the
particular sourceCs) from which it solicits the bid or
proposal
.
7. When the head of the executive agency determines it to
be necessary in the public interest to use procedures
other than competitive procedures. This exception
must be the subject of a written notification to the
Congress, thirty days in advance of the award of the
contract
29
Another major change as a result of CICA is the
mandatory 45 day combined waiting period for synopsis and
solicitation of the proposed procurement. Now, notices must
appear (for a minimum of 15 days) in the Commerce Business
Daily of the government's intent to solicit offers, plus a
six day transmittal time to the CBD . Then, solicitations
must remain open for a minimum of 30 days to allow time for
potential offerors to produce and submit their proposals.
CICA also increased the requirement for the type and
quantity of information to be included in the synopsis.
Another major element of CICA was the requirement for
each activity with procurement authority of $25,000 or more
to establish a Competition Advocate to ensure the new rules
were being followed. The Navy had spearheaded this
initiative prior to CICA by establishing its first
competition advocates at some field contracting activities
in 1982 in response to a Chief of Naval Material directive.
In July 1983, the Secretary of the Navy appointed RADM
Stuart Piatt as the first Competition Advocate General of
the Navy. At the field contracting level, this added
another review level to a system already brimming with
oversight and checks and balances.
CICA also changed (from $500,000 to $100,000) the
threshold, under the Truth in Negotiation Act, for requiring
certified cost or pricing data. This cost or pricing data
must be certified as being accurate, complete, and current
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as of the date, of the agreement on price, i.e. when the
"handshake" is made.
A final, but certainly no less significant, result of
CICA implementation is the change to the protest procedures.
Under CICA agencies are prohibited from proceeding with a
contract award if a protest has been filed within the proper
time frame and in accordance with applicable procedures.
Additionally, if a protest is received within 10 days after
award, performance must stop and may not be resumed until
the protest is adjudicated. These requirements hold true
unless the agency notifies the Comptroller General that the
contract award and/or performance must proceed due to
"urgent and compelling circumstances". [Ref . 5:p. 134] The
Comptroller General, after determining that the protest is
neither invalid or frivolous, has 90 days to recommend one
of five actions to the contracting officer. Depending on
the circumstances, the contracting officer may be directed
to:
1. refrain from exercising any- options under the
contract j
2. issue a new solicitation;
3. recompete the contract immediately;
4. terminate the contract;
5
.
make an award which is consistent with the
requirements of the statute or regulation which has
been violated.
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Although the gross PALT clock stops during a protest as
discussed in Chapter I of this study, CICA has opened the
door to a record number of protest actions, each one
delaying the delivery of needed goods and services and
increasing the time required to contract.
In summary, CICA has received mixed reviews in the two
years since its implementation. It is certain, however,
that the total dollar value of competitively awarded
contracts has increased substantially. In FY 85, NRCC
Philadelphia completed $752.8 million in contract awards
(awards in excess of $25,000). Of this total, $372.6
million or 49.5% were competed. In FY 86, the total award
figure was $655 million, of which $398.9 million or 61% were
competitively awarded. The total-Navy statistics for
competitive awards for FY 85 and FY 86 were 45% and 52%
respectively
.
However, a casualty of this adherence to the scope and
principle of CICA has been PALT. Along with the changes to
the procurement process and acquisition methodology
described above, has come ever increasing administrative
requirements and tasks . Further discussion of the impact on
PALT will be presented in the last section of this chapter.
C. THE PRODUCTIVE UNIT RESOURCING SYSTEM
The early 1980' s saw DOD, as a whole, under much
criticism for generating inefficiencies, using poor
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management, and operating a budgeting system encumbered by
duplicative reviews and far too many "fits and starts." As
the business manager for the Navy, the Commander, Naval
Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) , recognized the need for a
management system which would provide a correlation between
productivity, economy of operation, and mission goals at
NAVSUP field activities. In FY 86, the Productive Unit
Resourcing system (PURS) was instituted to provide for
management of the Operation and Maintenance, Navy (0<S£M,N)
budget execution process. PURS governs the management of
0&M,N resources provided by NAVSUP to the eight Naval Supply
Centers, four Naval Regional Contracting Centers, the Naval
Publications and Forms Center, the Aviation Supply Office
and Ships Parts Control Center, and the Navy Regional
Finance Center, Washington, DC.
The general theory behind PURS is to fund field
activities at the "required level of performance" and on the
basis of "actual work performed" rather than on a fixed
workyear by workyear method as used previously. PURS
requires, therefore, that the activity assumes the
responsibility to reduce the cost of work. As a result,
NAVSUP:
Expects to achieve substantial gains in workforce
productivity and economy of operations through the use
of a more flexible workforce, performance based
incentive systems, specifically defined performance
goals and management of overhead type costs. [Ref . 9:p.
1]
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To accomplish its goal of resource management
effectiveness, PURS embraces seven key concepts:
1. Fixed or non-productive overhead type costs are funded
as an allocation.
2. To facilitate management of the system, the number of
cost centers is kept to a minimum and defined by the
activity's major mission operations.
3. All costs that can be reasonably and discretely
identified and are influenced by an activity's




Service type functions which do not have a definable
productive unit are distributed back to user cost
center to the maximum extent practicable using a
chargeback system.
5. All activity direct 0«SitM,N resources are managed under
the system.
5. All productive units generated by an activity are
assumed to be the result of mission operations unless
they can be tied to a specific reimbursement
.
7. Generation of productive units as a result of efforts
to reduce a backlog that exists at the beginning of a
fiscal year must be justified to NAVSUP on a cost-
benefit basis prior to initiation of such efforts.
Determination of what constitutes an acceptable
backlog will be made and published prior to the start
of a fiscal year. [Ref . 9:p. 2]
Productive unit rates for a given fiscal year are
determined by a process which begins three to four months
prior to the start of a new fiscal year. Upon receipt of
the NAVCOMPT budget estimates and controls for the year, the
NAVSUP Comptroller forms a preliminary estimate of resource
availability for field activity operation. Concurrently,
NAVSUP issues a business plan call letter to field
commanders which defines fiscal controls and explains the
34
procedures to follow in developing productive unit rates and
workload projections. The activity projects its productive
unit rates, expected workload, overhead costs and, in the
case of the procurement activities, a PALT estimate for
large and small purchase actions. These figures are
submitted to NAVSUP as the activity's Business Plan for the
upcoming fiscal year.
The Business Plans are reviewed by NAVSUP and are added
together and compared with available resources as
constrained by the NAVCOMPT estimates. NAVSUP proposed
rates and overhead allocations are forwarded to field
activities for comment, and any reclamas are considered.
The end result of this "negotiation" process is the
determination of the annual productive unit rates, total
productive units, and overhead allocations for each cost
center. Individual cost centers, depending on the activity,
may be General and Administrative, Physical Distribution,
Inventory Control, Procurement, etc.
As business plans are approved, each activity receives a
Financial Operating Plan (FOP) . This letter details
resources the activity will receive, broken down by each of
the applicable productive, distributed and G&A cost centers,
and the total planned dollars the activity will receive.
The FOP also details appropriation guidance, reporting
requirements, and specific Navy controls.
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Thirty days after receipt of the FOP, activities are
required to submit execution plans to NAVSUP. The plans
define, as a group of monthly phasings, how the activity
intends to implement the thresholds and guidance in the FOP.
The monthly phasing plans are used by NAVSUP on a month
to month basis to compare planned execution against actual
performance. Funds are then recaptured by NAVSUP or paid
out, depending on the activity's performance. For example,
if an activity is producing fewer productive units than
planned but at a higher rate (the activity is being less
productive but more costly) , funds are recaptured by NAVSUP
at the planned rate. If more productive units are being
generated (the activity is being more productive and less
costly) , NAVSUP pays for additional units at the original
planned rate. To enable this comparison, field activities
submit monthly performance execution reports in a format
provided in the FOP.
For NRCC Philadelphia, the productive cost center is the
procurement cost center. It is defined as:
The Procurement Cost Center will resource all 0&M,N
labor and nonlabor costs incurred by an activity in
providing procurement services. It will be funded on
the basis of large and small purchase productive unit
cost rates multiplied by projected workload. Additions
and withdrawals will be based on actual quarterly
completions. [Ref . 9:p. 27]
Specific functions include large and small purchase
buying, contract and purchase administration, and
procurement overhead. Procurement overhead, such as
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printing costs, is allocated to the large and small purchase
accounts by a proration system.
Total productive units are reported monthly via the
Procurement Management Reporting System (PMRS) which
utilizes data from the Individual Contracting Action Reports
(DD Form 350) completed by the Contracts Specialists for
each action. PMRS automatically calculates the productive
units earned according to the following matrix:
STANDARD PRODUCTIVE
CONTRACT TYPE MANHOURS UNIT WEIGHTS
Del Order/GSA/ 13 1
Other Fed Agencies
Sealed Bids 39 3
Unpriced BOA Orders 13 1
Initial Placement of
BOAs/Contracts &
IDTCs < $25,000 26 2
Definitized BOA Orders
25K to <100K 39 3
lOOK to <500K 143 11
500K to <1M 143 11
IM to <10M 182 14
lOM and Greater 182 14
Negotiated Competitive Supply
25K to <100K 39 3
lOOK to <500K 52 4
500K to <1M 117 9
IM to <10M 182 14
lOM and Greater 182 14
Negotiated Competitive Service/CA Retained
25K to <100K 52 4
lOOK to <500K 156 12
500K to <1M 156 12
IM to <10M 195 15
lOM and Greater 195 15
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Negotiated Sole Source/8A/Nonprof it/Educ/Ut ilit ies
25K to <100K 52 4
lOOK to <500K 156 12
500K to <1M 156 12
IM to <10M 195 15
lOM and Greater 195 15
PURS, by its "manage to payroll" concept, provides for
more efficient control of available resources. Activities
must utilize their resources wisely and effectively to stay
within budget, and must be constantly on the alert for ways
to reduce costs and generate a lower productive unit rate.
PURS has also had, however, an affect on PALT . This affect
is discussed in the next section of this chapter.
D. THE IMPACT OF CICA AND RATE RESOURCING ON THE
ACQUISITION PROCESS AT NRCC PHILADELPHIA
CICA was enacted and PURS was implemented to correct
problematic situations that were evident in the acquisition
process. While it is understood that it is Congress'
responsibility to "protect the public trust", it is
debateable exactly how much micro-management is necessary to
ensure the American taxpayer is receiving best value for his
tax dollar. Whether or not Government procurement
professionals required CICA to instruct them in how to seek
out competition and receive best value for lowest cost is a
question that cannot be fully answered with the evidence at
hand
.
Rate resourcing in accordance with PURS is, on the
surface, a definitive solution for past inefficient
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management and should effectively enhance economical
operations. NAVSUP field activity commanders are more
responsible than ever to the "corporation" for the efficient
operation of their "subsidiary company."
In addition to major legislative or systematic changes
are the plethora of minor regulatory and procedural changes
that seem to occur on a daily basis. The simple fact that
the process is in a constant state of flux disrupts the
procurement process
. Our professionals need time to
assimilate the major changes and allow the acquisition
process to stabilize. It is doubtful that this time will be
available in the near future, however, with approximately
100 bills pending in Congress to make further changes to the
acquisition process. [Ref . 10:p. 13]
The impact of CICA on the administrative time required
to contract is great . While some provisions may serve to
reduce the time to perform one or more particular tasks,
current evidence points to a substantial net increase in
PALT. Interviews with key officials at NAVSUP and NRCC
Philadelphia indicated that the following changes have
contributed to increased PALT at NRCC Philadelphia:
1. The preparation of J&As for non-competitive
procurements has increased PALT. Although the
Determination and Findings (D&F) citing one of the 17
exceptions to formal advertising is no longer
required, the J&A requires more time due to the review
process (an extra review board must approve the J&A)




The mandatory waiting times for synopsis of planned
procurements in the CBD and the 30 day minimum
solicitation times have led to increased PALT . At
NRCC Philadelphia this means a minimum of 51 days (6
day transmittal time of the synopsis to the CBD plus
15 day synopsis plus 30 day solicitation) before the
Contracts Specialist can begin action to award a
contract
.
Increased competition means more prospective offerors
are receiving solicitations. While not true for every
procurement, this usually means more proposals are
received which must be evaluated. If technical
proposals are included, PALT increases exponentially,
with 150-200 day evaluation periods commonplace.
The reduced threshold for certified cost or pricing
data has lengthened lead times as offerors are taking
more time to ensure proposals are accurate, current
and complete. Contracts Specialists are taking longer
to analyze the proposals and performing more thorough
cost or price analysis.
More smaller firms, unfamiliar with Government
procedures and specifications, are requesting
solicitation packages since CICA implementation. This
has resulted in increased PALT because of the many
questions and uncertainties the smaller firms have
regarding the SOW or one or another of the
specifications. With the desire for "full and open
competition" it is difficult to decline a firm's
request for an extension of the solicitation closing
date
.
Another aspect of the increased number of proposals
received is in more time being required to receive
audit reports from DCAA and field pricing reports from
DCAS activities. While 60 days is normally the
required time to perform an audit and return the
report to the contracting activity, because of sheer
numbers it can take up to six months to receive the
audit reports
.
According to the Office of Counsel at NRCC
Philadelphia, the number of pre-award protests has
"skyrocketed". While it is true that PALT stops
during protest actions, it still represents a delay in
providing the goods or services to the customer. The
customer meanwhile is following his own PLT clock,




The affect of PURS in the acquisition process and PALT
at NRCC Philadelphia is possibly more indirect and less
tangible than the impact of CICA, but no less real. While
the system rewards productivity and efficiency of operation,
its productive unit weighting system for large purchase
production rewards "productivity by volume".
Although the higher weightings are assigned to the more
complicated, higher dollar value procurements, it is easy
for the Contracts Specialist to make up the difference by
processing more of the lower weighted, lower dollar value,
less complex actions and push the complex requirements aside
to work on as time allows. This can, over time, produce an
aged backlog of high dollar value requirements simply
because there are so many low dollar ones waiting. The
resultant increase in PALT for DCs is clearly shown by
statistical analysis in Chapter IV.
Additionally, the highest weighting assigned to any
contract action is 15. This weighting is given to
negotiated competitive service requirements, and negotiated
sole source/8A/Nonprof it/Educational Institution/Utility
requirements, of $1 million or greater. What is not
considered, however, is the requirement in the Defense
supplement to the FAR which states
:
Written acquisition plans shall be prepared
for .. .production and service acquisitions whose total
contractual cost is estimated at $15 million for all
years or $5 million for any fiscal year. [Ref . ll:Pt. 7]
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The writing and approval of a formal acquisition plan
may take several months to accomplish. The additional time
and effort required of the field activity is not being
recognized under the current weighting system.
Another important consideration of PURS is the incentive
to produce a lower quality contractual product in order to
complete as many actions as possible during a given time
period. The emphasis is on productivity, although each
field activity under PURS is required to establish quality
goals, it is extremely difficult to quantify a quality
contractual product . The standard appears to be "do the
best possible job but above all be productive". Quality may
be taking a back seat to productivity.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter has discussed two major Congressional and
Naval initiatives, CICA and PURS, to improve the overall
acquisition process. Key elements of each initiative were
presented and analyzed, and were finally discussed as to
their specific impact on the acquisition process and PALT at
NRCC Philadelphia.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE (ANOVA) OF PALT STATISTICS
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to present an analysis of
variance (ANOVA) of the PALT data provided by NRCC
Philadelphia. The primary focus of the chapter is to
determine to what extent the implementation of CICA and PURS
has affected PALT at NRCC Philadelphia. The chapter also
presents the researcher's analysis of the ANOVA results.
The data analyzed are the average monthly large purchase
PALT statistics for the period October 1984 through August
1987.
B. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE (ANOVA) OF NRCC PHILADELPHIA PALT
STATISTICS
Chapter III of this study presented a discussion of the
acquisition environment at NRCC Philadelphia and included a
detailed discussion of the two initiatives that have
contributed significantly to change of that environment, the
acquisition process, and PALT at NRCC Philadelphia. This
chapter presents an analysis of NRCC PALT data generated
during the period October 1984 through August 1987. The
data, the average large purchase PALT statistics for the




1. Total PALT for all large purchase actions.
2. PALT for orders against contracts (OACs) , including
unpriced BOA orders, delivery orders, and orders
against GSA schedules (ADP and non-ADP)
.
3. PALT for new, definitized contracts (DCs), including
sealed bids, negotiated competitive supply, negotiated
competitive R&D and services, and sole source.
Figures 3 and 4 graphically represent the data. Figure
3 displays PALT behavior for OACs and total PALT for the
period. While total PALT has exhibited an overall increase,
from a mean of 31 days in October 1984 to a mean of 76 days
in August 1987, OAC PALT has remained relatively stable. OAC
PALT is, of course, included in the total PALT curve
displayed
.
Figure 4 represents the behavior of DC PALT and total
PALT. DC PALT exhibits a definite and steady increase from
a mean of 71.46 days in October 1984 to a mean of 170.18
days in August 1987. As with OAC PALT, DC PALT is included
in the total PALT curve. It is evident that OAC PALT has
significantly influenced total PALT, as the separation
between DC PALT and total PALT indicates.
Each graph has been separated into three distinct
populations. A, B, and C. Population A represents the pre-
CICA timeframe, B represents the period after enactment of
CICA and prior to PURS implementation, and C is the period
after PURS implementation. For Figure 3, the cutoff for
populations A and B are April and October 1985 respectively.
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Source: Developed by Researcher
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October 1985 was the first month under PURS. In Figure 4,
however, the populations are divided a bit differently. The
cutoff for population A represents the researcher's estimate
of when the effects of CICA were first evident in either
increased or decreased PALT . July 1985 is a "best estimate"
and was arrived at by projecting total average pre-CICA PALT
of 91 days (3 months) forward and assuming that all pre-CICA
PRs in process would be completed without any affect from
the new legislation. Likewise, the cutoff for population B
represents the researcher's best estimate of when the
affects of PURS implementation would first be felt (March
1986)
.
The data was analyzed with respect to these separate and
distinct populations. For both figures, population A
represents pre-CICA data, population B post-CICA and pre-
PURS, and population C post-CICA and post-PURS data.
While the graphs depict PALT behavior for OACs and DCs
as affected by CICA and PURS, the researcher is interested
in determining the extent to which each initiative affects
PALT. To accomplish this, an ANOVA was performed to test if
the different populations have significantly different
means. Specifically, is there sufficient variation between
the population means to indicate PALT was truly affected by
an initiative?
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Using the Minitab statistical computing system, the data
was entered and the ANOVA executed, with results as follows.
The means of the various populations are:
1
.















































An analysis of these statistics clearly indicates that
while PALT for OACs has remained virtually unchanged, PALT
for DCs and total PALT has increased steadily since
implementation of CICA and PURS. Of particular significance
is the B+C mean for DC PALT. This mean illustrates the
extent to which post-CICA and post-PURS PALT has increased
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over the A or pre-CICA/pre-PURS period. The question
remains, however, is the difference between the means
significant enough to indicate a direct affect of CICA
and/or PURS? To answer this question, the ANOVA was run to
test the null hypothesis: Ho : mean«* = means = meanc . In
other words, there is no significant difference between the
means, therefore, CICA and PURS have had no significant
affect on PALT at NRCC Philadelphia.
If the difference between the means is significant, then
the research hypothesis. Ha: one or more of the means is not
equal, is supported and the null hypothesis is rejected.
The ANOVA test shows statistically whether or not the mean
weighted average PALT has increased.
In performing the ANOVA, Minitab calculates an F-
STATISTIC to use in determining whether or not the null
hypothesis should be accepted or rejected. If the F-
STATISTIC is significantly large then it can be said that
the variance between the means is greater than what would be
normally expected due to simple random variation or "noise".
Just how large the F-STATISTIC must be is determined by the
confidence level desired. This confidence level is applied
to an F table to calculate the critical value which is
compared to the computed F-STATISTIC. If the critical value
is larger than the F-STATISTIC, the null hypothesis is
accepted. If the critical value is smaller than the F-
STATISTIC, the null hypothesis is rejected. The researcher
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chose a confidence level of 95% for this particular test.
The reaults of the ANOVA are as follows:
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1 . Analysis of PALT for Total PALT (OACs and DCs)
An analysis of the ANOVA results indicates that in
nearly every case, the null hypothesis that the population
means are equal can be rejected, and the research hypothesis
that the means are not equal can be supported. The greatest
difference in comparing F-STATISTIC to critical value was
computed when each population was tested against the other
two (A vs B vs C) . This shows that, overall, mean total
PALT increased during the period October 1984 through August
1987. The only instance in which the F-STATISTIC was lower
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than the critical value was in testing A+B vs C. This
indicates that, statistically, the means of total PALT for
populations A and B combined does not differ significantly
from mean total PALT of population C, although the actual
difference in mean PALT was a 12.88 day increase. The
actual mean difference between the populations can therefore
be attributed to random variation or random events and not
any specific event itself (in this case, the implementation
of PURS)
.
2 . Analysis of PALT for OACs
An analysis of the test results for OACs reveals
that the null hypothesis is not rejected, and the research
hypothesis that the population means for OAC PALT are not
equal cannot be supported. A review of the PALT means for
the various populations reveals very little difference in
actual means. For example, mean PALT for population A is
33.47 days and for population C is 32.41 days, an actual
decrease of 1.06 days. Any difference between the
populations can be attributed to random variation or random
events, and not any particular event such as the enactment
of CICA or the implementation of PURS. An analysis of these
test results must go beyond mere examination of numbers to
fully understand the outcome and relate it to CICA and PURS.
The intent of CICA was to legislate full and open
competition for the federal procurement process. For OACs,
CICA would have little affect as it would have been the
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original contract, be it a Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA),
indefinite quantity or indefinite delivery-type contract, or
a General Services Administration (GSA) schedule that would
have been awarded subject to the provisions of CICA. The
orders subsequently issued against these contracts would be
subject to the provisions of the contracts.
Additionally, the implementation of PURS would have
little affect on OAC PALT except in rewarding the award of
more OACs versus DCs because of the productive unit
weighting system discussed in chapter III of this study.
Examination of the raw PALT data provided by NRCC
Philadelphia supports this view. During the pre-CICA and
post-CICA periods (populations A and B) , 1666 OAC actions
were completed, an average of 98 per month. During the
post-PURS period represented by population C, 1976 OAC
actions were completed, an average of 110 per month. The
number of DC actions completed during the same period
decreased from an average of 93 per month (A and B) to an
average of 71 per month (C) . While DC PALT will be examined
in greater detail later on in this chapter, it is important
at this point to note that for populations A+B vs C, the
ANOVA test revealed a significant increase in mean PALT for
DCs of 57.61 days. This analysis indicates that more OACs
were awarded in a slightly shorter timeframe, while fewer DC
actions were completed, but taking a significantly longer
time to award. This supports the researcher's view that
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PURS compensates the award of easy to complete actions (such
as OACs) while increasing the PALT of DCs which are put
aside to form aged backlogs
.
3. Analysis of PALT for DCs
An analysis of the ANOVA test results for DC actions
shows that in every case mean PALT increased significantly
over the period examined. This supports the research
hypothesis that the population means are not equal, and that
the null hypothesis of mean equality is rejected. Of
particular note is the increase in PALT between the pre-CICA
and post-CICA periods. The statistical evidence strongly
supports the researcher's view that CICA initiatives have
increased PALT for DCs. Mean PALT increased from 96.24 days
(pre-CICA) to 137.76 days (post-CICA), a difference of 41.52
days
.
From the test results, it appears that PURS
implementation has also had the purported effect on PALT.
Of great significance is the comparison of populations A+B
vs C. The computed F-STATISTIC is 32.02 against a critical
value of 5.57, a very strong indication of the difference
between the PALT means. Additionally, the PALT mean for
populations A+B is 113.34 days while for population C the
mean is 170.95 days, a difference of 57.61 days. It appears
PURS implementation, again mostly due to the productive unit
weighting system, has had significant affect on mean DC
PALT. While the portion of the increase of DC PALT directly
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attributable to PURS cannot be readily determined, DC PALT
increased by approximately 43% from the pre-CICA period to
the post-CICA period. DC PALT increased another 24% after
PURS implementation. This increase over and above the
initial increase attributable directly to CICA points out




This chapter presented an analysis of variance (ANOVA)
of the PALT data provided by NRCC Philadelphia for the
period October 1984 through August 1987. The results of the
ANOVA show that total PALT has increased overall since the
passage of CICA and PURS implementation. OAC PALT has not
displayed a statistically significant increase, but it was
shown that CICA would not have a strong effect on the
placing of orders against previously awarded contracts.
Likewise, PURS implementation has had little affect on OAC
actions, except that more OAC actions were completed in less
time. DC PALT, however, increased significantly as a result
of CICA and PURS. Using a 3-month period as an adjustment
factor to estimate when the initial effects of CICA would be
felt, and a 4-month factor for PURS, DC PALT displayed a
strong, steady increase.
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The researcher attempted to answer the following primary
research question: What are the principal factors which
comprise PALT and how have these factors been affected by
the changing acquisition environment, leading to increased
PALT?
While analysis of the research data indicated that there
are factors external and internal to the acquisition process
at NRCC Philadelphia that contribute to increased PALT,
there are certain specific procedures and means which can
lead to a reduced PALT. The research in this study
identified several factors which contribute significantly to
increased PALT at NRCC Philadelphia. These factors are
presented in the conclusions discussed in this chapter. The
recommendation portion of the chapter addresses procedures
and methods for reduction of PALT. The recommendation
portion is followed by a discussion of the research
questions and suggestions for further research.
B. CONCLUSIONS
1 . Conclusion 1
Enactment of the Competition in Contracting Act of
1984 and implementation of the Productive Unit Resourcing
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system have impacted on the acquisition process at NRCC
Philadelphia to cause increased PALT
.
As noted in Chapter III, section D, CICAs mandate
for full and open competition among all available potential
sources has made it difficult to reduce the time required to
award a contract. The J&A approval process, for example,
requires extra time (at NRCC Philadelphia an extra approval
board must meet) over and above the pre-CICA process of D&F
approval. The establishment of the Competition Advocates at
the field activities to ensure compliance with the rules
concerning J&A composition and approval was a clear
harbinger of increased PALT. Then, of course, if the
requirement is valued in excess of $1,000,000, the J&A must
be approved by NAVSUP, and if over $10,000,000, the ASN
(S&L) has approval authority. The approval process can lead
to PALT increases of 180 days or more.
The mandatory synopsis and solicitation waiting
times have also led to increased PALT. NRCC Philadelphia
experiences a six-day transmittal period (of the synopsis)
to the CBD
,
plus the minimum 15-day period that the
synopsis must appear in the publication. Then, the
solicitation is issued and must remain open for a minimum of
30 days. In total, this represents a minimum of 51 days
before the Contracts Specialist can take any real action
towards awarding a contract . On top of the minimum
requirements are the requests for extensions of the
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solicitation closing dates from potential offerors, which
are difficult to turn down in the face of the full and open
competition mandate.
More proposals are being received by the NRCC which
means more evaluation time is required. If technical
proposals must be evaluated, this can add 150-200 days PALT
to the requirement . More proposals also means more DCAA
audits . Because of the sheer enormity of workload, it can
take up to six months to receive an audit report. The
lowered threshold for certified cost or pricing data has
also increased PALT as contractors are taking more time than
ever to put their proposals together.
While OACs have been relatively untouched by the
affects of CICA and PURS, DC PALT has increased
significantly. As discussed in Chapter IV, mean DC PALT has
increased from 96.24 days pre-CICA/pre-PURS to 170.95 days
post-CICA/post-PURS
.
The affect of PURS on PALT at NRCC Philadelphia,
while not as direct and obvious an impact as CICA has had,
is no less important. The productive unit weighting system
is rewarding the completion of low dollar value, low-
complexity actions while allowing the higher dollar value,
higher-complexity requirements to age.
2 . Conclusion 2
An analysis of the various management techniques and
initiatives in place at NRCC Philadelphia to control PALT
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indicates that the activity is utilizing the methods and
tools currently available to control and reduce PALT
. The
Commanding Officer chairs weekly "Hot List" meetings wherein
the status of all critical and/or high-visibility
requirements currently in-house is reviewed. PALT is, of
course, one of the chief topics of concern. Also chaired by
the Commanding Officer are the Monthly Management Briefs
where each overaged requirement is tracked on a monthly
basis and closely scrutinized for ways to resolve problems
and learn lessons to prevent future overaged actions
.
Another initiative which serves to control PALT is
the organization of the Contracts Division. As discussed in
Chapter II, the Contracts Division at NRCC Philadelphia is
organized by customers served. Each branch is assigned a
number of requiring activities for which it provides
contracting support and services. This method of
organization allows the Contracts Specialists to become
extremely familiar with the particular and unique
requirements of their customers. It also fosters better
working relationships between the requiring activity and
NRCC personnel .
3 . Conclusion 3
The researcher believes that PALT may not be the
best indicator of efficient, effective performance for a
Navy Field Contracting Activity.
57
From the customer's perspective, PALT is the primary
performance indicator. The customer is only concerned with
when its requirement will be satisfied. This "total time to
deliver" includes more than just PALT, as was discussed in
Chapter I. PALT is only one of the two components of PCLT
,
or procurement lead time, the other being production lead
time (PLT)
.
The customer, however, believes that all of the
time between the submittal of his requirement to the
procuring activity and the final acceptance of the good or
service are to be considered the "contracting activity's
time" or time that is charged to the operational and
administrative functioning of the procurement shop. Thus,
PALT has become the key indicator of how well the
contracting activity is supporting its customers.
For the contracting activity itself, however, PALT
may not be the best possible indicator of effective
performance. In large purchasing there are too many
variables for PALT to be considered a standard measure of
effectiveness. Each procurement is unique in some way: the
difference in dollar value, the method of procurement
planned, the contract vehicle contemplated, and even the
requirement itself. Although there are standard procedures
for most elements of the procurement process, there cannot
be standard times or performance periods. Some timeframes
are mandated or regulated, but in the current procurement
environment, the timeframes are very often exceeded. PALT
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does not adequately describe the efforts of the procurement
professional to support his or her customers.
PALT also overshadows a more important indicator of
performance, the output of a quality contractual product.
While a low PALT emphasizes completion of the action in the
shortest time possible, it conflicts with the generation of
a contractual relationship free from error, ambiguity, and
"latent defect." Although it is beyond the scope of this
thesis to determine a correlation between low PALT and
increased numbers of required post-award actions, the
researcher believes that a contract must be as error-free as
feasible within the given resource constraints . Producing
an error-free contract requires a certain amount of time,
and to attempt to produce this effort in a shorter period




While it is evident that the initiatives of legislation
such as CICA and productivity enhancement programs like PURS
are here to stay and that even more legislation and
regulation is on the way, procurement managers must be
constantly aware of methods and procedures to enhance the
level of support provided to the customer.
Since the level of oversight may increase, and more and
more constraints may be placed upon the procurement
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professional from outside of the agency, managers must be
ever sensitive to new ways to maintain excellence when
reform initiatives are imposed. Accordingly, the following
recommendations are presented as possible methods for the
control and reduction of PALT
.
1 . Recommendation 1
Initiate program of customer education and training
to foster better understanding and awareness of procurement
regulations, policies, and procedures.
The phases of the acquisition process that
contribute the most to PALT are the pre-solicitat ion phase
and the evaluation phase. In both of these phases the
customer is heavily involved. In the pre-solicitat ion
phase, the Contracts Specialist must carefully review the
SOW to ensure its contracability . If seriously deficient,
the control number is cancelled and the PR is sent back to
the customer for rework. Only then does the PALT clock
stop. If only minor deficienies exist, the PR is retained
in-house and the customer is notified of the deficiencies.
In this case the PALT clock continues to run, waiting for
the customer to correct the problem. In the evaluation
phase, when technical proposals are involved, the
contracting activity is totally at the mercy of the
evaluating activity.
An education program which would provide customers
with a clear understanding of the specific content and
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extent of information required in PR packages as well as
training on specific guidelines for proposal evaluation
would be extremely beneficial in reducing the overall time
required to contract. NAVSUP Publication 547, Contract
Request Preparation Guide, could be used in developing a




Utilize "early synopsis" whenever possible to
streamline the pre-solicitation phase of the acquisition
process
.
Through proper planning by the customer activity and
early identification of requirements, some synopses may be
submitted to the CBD prior to receipt of the PR by NRCC
Philadelphia. Requirements which may fall in this category
are yearly recurring requirements and those for which the
SOW is essentially firm with little chance of change. The
synopsis, in the format required by FAR 5.207, would be
composed jointly by the customer and NRCC contracts
personnel. Then, while final touches are being added to the
PR package by the requiring activity, the synopsis would
appear in the CBD . allowing for immediate preparation and
issuance of the solicitation upon receipt of the PR package
by NRCC Philadelphia.
3 Recommendation 3
NRCC Philadelphia should submit a recommendation to
NAVSUP for revising the productive unit weighting system
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under PURS to more effectively incentivize the completion of
high-dollar value, high-complexity requirements.
At present, the highest weightings are assigned to
the completion of contract actions of $1 million or higher.
Significantly more time and effort is required, however, in
awarding contracts over $1 million, as in the case of formal
acquisition plans being required for procurements valued in
excess of $15 million. Under the current weighting system,
this significant effort is^ not recognized.
4 , Recommendation 4
NRCC Philadelphia should implement a management
information system (MIS) to assist Contracts Specialists in
becoming more efficient
.
While NRCC Philadelphia currently has an in-house
automated procurement tracking system, what is needed is an
integrated system that contains important historical and
decision support data and capabilities to reduce the
administrative time required to generate a procurement.
Data on contractor's past performance, pricing of same or
similar items, available sources, and management control
information, as well as a document preparation capability
are desirable features of an MIS. The DLA Pre-Award
Contracting System (DPACS) currently in the implementation
stages at DISC is an excellent example of the type of MIS






What are the principal factors which comprise PALT
and how have these factors been affected by the changing
acquisition environment, leading to increased PALT?
As discussed in Chapter I and detailed in Chapter
II, PALT is comprised of all the actions and tasks required
to be performed by the contracting activity after receipt of
the PR until the award document is signed by the contracting
officer. Some of these factors are mandated through
legislation and/or regulation and are not inherently
flexible. Other factors can be modified or altered to fit
the set of particular circumstances for each procurement to
reduce the amount of time required to generate a contract.
Enhanced education of the customer, early synopsis where
feasible, and development of an acquisition MIS can have a
positive impact on NRCC Philadelphia's ability to decrease
PALT.
2 Subsidiary Question 1
Are the methods currently used by NRCC Philadelphia
procurement managers to control PALT effective?
As discussed in Conclusion 2, NRCC Philadelphia is





What affect has the increased emphasis on
competition fostered by CICA implementation had on PALT?
It is clearly evident from the research, as detailed
in Chapter III and statistically supported in Chapter IV,
that CICA has led to significantly increased PALT for new,
definitized contracts. The affect on orders against
contracts has been minimal
.
4 Subsidiary Question 3
Is the relationship between PALT, productivity and
output of a quality contractual product a workable
relationship?
As discussed in Chapter III, the current acquisition
environment appears to place most emphasis on productivity.
This can lead to reduced quality. Adding concern for a too
high PALT statistic to the emphasis on productivity can
result in the generation of a contractual product sorely
lacking in quality.
The relationship between PALT, productivity and
quality i_s workable if the correct and proper weighting is
assigned to each element in the process. NRCC Philadelphia




Has the Productive Unit Resourcing System (PURS)
caused increased PALT?
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As discussed in Chapter IV, while the exact impact
that PURS has had on PALT cannot be quantified, it is
apparent from the statistical testing that PURS has led to
increased PALT at NRCC Philadelphia for DCs. As with the
affect of CICA implementation, PURS has had minimal impact
on OACs, except that more OACs are being awarded in a
shorter period.
6 . Subsidiary Question 5
Should current PALT standards be revised?
There are no longer any across-the-board standards
for PALT at any NFCS activity. PALT goals are negotiated
with NAVSUP and become a part of the business plan agreement
each fiscal year. In this way, the goals for each activity
are updated based on actuals from the preceeding period.
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Research conducted for this thesis has revealed the
following areas for future study. Since the research was
limited in scope and methodology, these areas have
potentially significant implications for continued
improvements to the procurement process:
1. Research the affects of CICA and PURS on the small




Research the specific affects of increased emphasis on
productivity and a low PALT on output of a qualtity




3. Develop measurements of effectiveness for controlling
and managing a quality contractual product in a NFCS
procurement environment and determine how quality can
be incentivized while maintaining required levels of
productivity
.
4. Study the acquisition process at NRCC Philadelphia to
determine the potential savings in PALT from the
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